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NOTES
EVOLUTION OF THE STOP, LOOK AND LISTEN DOCTRINE
IN NEW JERSEY
"When a man goes upon a railroad track, he knows that he goes to a place
where he will be killed if a train comes upon him before he is clear of the track.
He knows that he must stop for the train, not the train for him. In such circum-
stances, it seems to us that if a driver cannot be sure, otherwise whether a train is
dangerously near he must stop, and get out of his vehicle, although obviously he will
not often be required to do more than to stop and look. It seems to us that if he
relies upon not hearing the train or any signal and takes no further precaution he
does so at his own risk." Mr. Justice Holmes in Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Co.
v. Goodman, 275 U. S. 66, 48 Sup. Ct. 24, 56 A. L. R. 645 (1928).
This is the stop, look and listen rule as laid down by our federal courts and
this is also the law in Pennsylvania.' But is this the law of New Jersey? If not,
how close do the New Jersey courts come to following this rule?
In the early case of Moore v. Central Railroad Co., 4 Zabriskie 268 (N. J.
1854), it appears that we have the first case from which the rule (as it may be
applied in New Jersey) evolved. This case involved an action for injuries received
by the plaintiff, who was a stage coach driver, when he was struck by the railroad
cars of the defendant while driving his stage upon a public turnpike. This turn-
pike was crossed by the railroad tracks of the defendant. Held, that the plaintiff
cannot recover if it appears that the want of ordinary care or prudence on his part
contributed to the injury.
In a full report by Ogden, J., after close examination of the English cases
therein cited, it was said, "In 10 Meeson and Welsby 546, Davies v. Mann, called
the donkey case, the court said, 'Negligence of a plaintiff, to prevent a recovery,
must be such as that he could by ordinary care have avoided the consequences of
the defendant's negligence. If by ordinary care he could have avoided them, he
cannot recover.' " Judge Ogden goes on further to say, "The plaintiff was traveling
upon a turnpike road established by legislative enactment. Thie Central Rail-
road Company derived power from the same source to cross the turnpike with rail-
road track. They are also authorized to run their trains unrestricted as to motive,
power, speed or time. The fact is notorious throughout the country, that the public
exigencies of travel and mail transportation demand and require from railroad com-
panies the running of fast trains. The great desideratum with the passengers is speed,
and so pervading is its influence that no restraint has, as yet, been put by law upon
the rapidity with which public ordinary roads may be crossed."
From this case, the rule under consideration began in the form of an imposi-
tion upon travelers of the highways2 as a means by which any hindrance to our
I North Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v. Heileman. 49 Pa. 60, 88 Am. Dec. 482 (1865).
2 Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v. Righter, 42 N. J. L. 185 (1880).
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growing railroads, in the form of lawsuits, was alleviated. Here there were two
equal positions to consider; both parties had the right to be where they were, at the
same time. Thus the important question evolved, who was to have the superior
right? The court took the position that as against the individual, the mushrooming
railroad was to predominate, for it was felt that the development of railroads and
the extension of our systems of travel and communication were of the highest prior-
ity in the economic growth of our country.
In a concurring opinion in the Moore case, supra, Potts, J., said, "In this age,
so prolific of change, when railroads have come to occupy all our great lines of
travel, coursing through our cities and villages . . . courts are called on to exert
all the power they possess in guarding the public from the danger incident to negli-
gence in their (the trains) us*." (Parenthetical matter supplied).
This is an honest and frank admission that the public need be safeguarded,
and as regards the equal rights granted to both the public and the railroad at cross-
ings, that the railroad is given the preferential rights. However, after admitting the
pressing need for protection of the public, Potts, J., goes on to say, "The whole
subject will probably at some distant day, imperiously demand the interposition
of legislative regulation, but until this is done we can only apply to the cases of
negligence the settled rules of existing law. . . We sit here not to make but to
administer the law and we must do so by the existing rules."
The existing rules to which Judge Potts referred were those which governed
the cases of ordinary negligence and which were at this time embedded in the
English common law. It was from these rules that the law governing railroads
grew in this country. It is interesting to note that at this time there was no definite
requirement that one must resort to stop, look and listen as a standard of care for
the traveller, but rather the court used the words "ordinary care" as describing the
conduct required of the general public. From the freedom which was granted to
the railroad as far as their standard of care was concerned, the traveler was required
to use "such caution that is comm'ensurate with the probabilities of danger."
The case of Runyon v. The Central Railroad Company of New Jersey, 1 Dutch-
er 556 (N. J. 1856), is the first indication that from the standard of care describ-
ed by Judge Ogden in the Moore case, supra, was to evolve the rule under consid-
eration.
This was an action brought by the plaintiff for damages occasioned by a
collision with a train of cars of the defendant railroad. It was held that if by the
exercise of ordinary skill and care the plaintiff could have avoided the injury, or
if his conduct contributed to produce it, he could not recover. Judge Potts said,
"But besides this, persons approaching a crossing in vehicles of their own must
use their eyes and ears and exercise common care and prudence to avoid a collision,
8 Potts, J., in Runyon v. The Central Railroad Company of New Jersey, 1 Dutcher 556 (1856).
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commensurate with the danger or they are no less reprehensible." (Italics supplied).
Although the actual words "look" and "listen" were not used per se, it can be seen
that this language would soon evolve into a definite rule.
In 1868 the word "look" became a part of the doctrine. It was held that a
traveler upon the highway who fails to "look" for an approaching train is guilty of
negligence and cannot recover for injuries received in a collision with a passing
train.4
In 1880 the word "look" was added to the word "listen". In Pennsylvania Rail-
road v. Righter,6 it was said: "A primary rule of legal caution is that a person about
to cross a railroad is bound to use his eyes and ears, to watch for sign boards and to
listen for a bell or a whistle and to guard against the approach of a train by looking
each way before crossing." (Italics supplied).
It was not until seven years later that the word "stop" came in the doctrine.
In Merkle v. The New York, Lake Erie and Western Railroad Company, 49 N. J. L.
473 (1887), it was said, "Inasmuch as he (plaintiff) could not see an approaching
train at any considerable distance from the track, ordinary prudence required him
to stop when he was near enough to the railroad to ascertain, at least by listening,
whether there was danger or not." (Italics and parenthetical matter supplied).
It is true that the word "stop" was finally added to the doctrine, but the word
was not used in the strict sense as applied in the federal and Pennsylvania courts.
For in Pennsylvania6 and the federal courts7 failure to stop, look and listen is
negligence per se. All three acts, that of stopping, looking and listening, require
separate performance. Each is a singular distinct act. In New Jersey, however, a
person is required to stop only if he cannot look and listen without stopping. This,
therefore, makes the act of stopping a condition subsequent, its performance depend-
ent upon the ability of the traveler to first look and listen. If the traveler can look
and listen, then stopping is not required of him. The rule was further reiterated in
Passman v. West Jersey and Seashore Railroad Co., 68 N. J. L. 719, 54 A. 809
(1903), where it was said that, "It is necessary to look and listen and if it is neces-
sary to stop in order to make the looking and listening effective, the neglect to
stop will bar the right of action of the person to whom injury so results."
The law until this time developed with what it seems was a constant placing
of burdens upon the traveler. The attitude of the courts seemed to be one of con-
fining the traveler to narrow limits in the exercise of ordinary care. They had
established rules, and any infraction of these limiting rules would automatically
make the traveler contributorily negligent and bar his right to recover. In 1909 how-
ever, the New Jersey Legislature passed the Statute Act of April 4, 1909. This Act
was perhaps an indication that the cause of the traveler was being aided by the
4 Haslan v. Morris & Essen Railroad Co., 33 N. J. L. 147 (1868).
5 Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v. Righter, 42 N. J. L. 185 (1880).
6 Decker v. Lehigh Valley Railroad Co., 181 Pa. 465, 37 A. 570 (1894).
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legislature. This Act stated, "In any action brought for injuries to person or prop-
erty or for death caused at any crossing protected as aforesaid, (the statute supplies
the manner in which crossings should be protected) no plaintiff shall be barred
of the action because of the failure of the person injured or killed to stop, look and
listen before passing over the crossing."
In effect then, the legislature has by statute placed upon the railroad an abso-
lute liability, if the situation falls within the limits as prescribed by the statute.
"Such a condition of things, under the statute referred to, absolved the plaintiff's
intestate from stopping, looking and listening." 8 This Act was further upheld in
Hatch v. Erie Railroad Co., 88 N. J. L. 545, 97 A. 38 (1916), where it was held
that a plaintiff entering a highway crossing upon the rising of safety gates, who
was struck by a train, was not negligent for failure to look and listen.
For a brief period, it appeared as though the care required of both railroad and
traveler were to be equalized. However, in 1928, the New Jersey court extended
the rule once again. This time it approached the adoption of the federal stop, look
and listen rule but fell short of doing so. In an opinion by Lloyd, J., in Stryker v.
Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 140 A. 451 (1928), it was there held, quoting in part
Justice Holmes,9 "When a man goes upon a railroad track he knows that he goes
to a place where he will be killed if a train comes upon him before he is clear of the
track. He knows he must stop for the train, not the train stop for him."
After quoting Justice Holmes, the conclusion would be drawn that the court is
to adopt the views so quoted, but this was not the case. After a brief summation
of the facts, Judge Lloyd goes on to say not that it was the absolute duty of the
traveler to stop but that he should have controlled his car in such a manner as to
avoid a collision.
In conclusion, the care which the law of New Jersey requires of the traveler
on the highway, where the highway and the tracks of a railroad cross, is one not
of stop, look and listen, but rather a rule of effective observation.
"The rule of effective obs'ervation as defined in Conkling v. Erie Railroad Co.,
63 N. J. L. 338, 43 A. 666 (1899), is namely--the duty of the traveler on the
highway does not stop with looking and listening, but he must exercise care to st-
lect a position from which an effective observation can be made, and he must ex-
ercise care to make the act of looking and listening reasonably effective." 10
Joseph A. Asbell
7 Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co. v. Goodman, 275 U. S. 66, 48 Sup. Ct. 24 (1928).
8 Fernetti v. West Jersey and S. R. Co., 87 N. J. L. 268, 93 A. 576 (1911).
9 Goodman case, note 7, supra.
10 Burling, J., in Grosso v. Pennsylvania, Reading Seashore Line, 23 N. J. Misc. 188, 42
A.2d 778 (1945).
